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PROCEEDINGS AND D EBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION 
WASHINGTON, THU RSDAY, JUNE 1, 1967 
Senate 
I N THE SHADOW OF VIET NAM 
(Commencement address by Senator MtKF 
MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, Ha\'er-
!ord, Pa., May 30, 1937) 
I t Is doubtful that there has ever been n 
good time to graduate !rom college. There 
Is only an Inevitable time and you have ar-
r ived at lt. I! you have a sense of concern as 
to the future, It may be somewhat reassuring 
to note that It Is a feeling which has been 
sh ared b y graduating classes as far back as 
anyone can remember. 
And, yet, this class of 1967 Is entitled to a n 
uncommon concern about the future You 
graduate In uncommon circumstances. You 
walk out directly Into the shadow or Viet 
Nam. 
Since that Is the case, you are not likely to 
h ave m uch Interest In what I might say 
about the job opportunities "out there". Nor 
do I believe that you would be especially en-
thralled by comments on medicare, highway 
beautification, antipoverty programs, the 
peace corps or a dozen or more other creative 
and useful legislative enterprises which have 
been Initiated In recent years by the federal 
government. 
I expect that what you expect from me Is 
to make some sense on the question of VIet 
Nam-on the war and Its prospects and your 
prospects In the light of lt. I do not know 
that I can live up to those expectations II 
what you seek Is a punchcard computation 
or satisfying answers. I do not have that sort 
of Information and I do not know how to 
run the computers. As one Senator, I ha'e 
only tbe personal estimates and a ttl tudes 
wh ich come !rom a long etrort to try to un -
derstand what Is Involved In the problems~or 
VIet Nam and Asia. I have only the concerns 
Which I share wl th young people as to their 
personal future In the light of this perslstmg 
dlfflculty. I have only an awareness or the 
curtain of uncertainty which VIet Nam has 
drawn across the pursuit of happiness In this 
nation and the prospects for continued civil-
Ized sutvlval everywhere In the world. 
On the part o! the United States. the 
eventual resolution or the conflict In VIet 
Nam will depend greatly on the President 
and the Executive Branch of the government 
It will, also, depend In part on Senators ancl 
Congressmen. In the last analysis. howe,•er. 
It will depend heavily on the people of the 
nation and, In particular, on the reaction of 
young persons such as yourselves to this sit-
uation. Your opinions on VIet Nam are rele-
vant and you have not only a right but. If 
you are so Inclined, a public duty to express 
them. You also have, however, an obligation 
to ask; you have a responsibility to listen and 
these are antecedent to the responsible exer-
cise of your right and duty to speak. In short, 
you owe It to yourselves, to your country and 
to the vitality or the Institutions In which 
you have matured to make your opinions as 
Informed as possible. In the hope or contnb-
utlng something to that end, I make these 
rem~rks today. 
The VIet Nam war has been so often In the 
news that at times It seems that for several 
years nothing else or note h as happened 
In the world. We have had an Incessant 
bombardment from the communications 
media. We have been exposed to the horrors 
and the heroics and to the de.tructlon and 
the d edication or this war. We have had 
almost a. surfeit or !acts as well as a. torrent 
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of Irrelevances. Yet the pnttern of the con-
flict Ia Illusive and Ita purpoocs remain ob-
scure. We have known the frustration Which 
comes from an ever more Intensely sought 
peace In an ever more Intensely !ought war. 
It Is difficult In these circumstances to 
maintain a balanced view of the conflict or 
our role In 1~. Indeed, the VIetnamese con-
!llct ls as a powerful drug which has been 
administered to the American body politic. 
The effect on some Individuals has been that 
of a heady stimulant; they would go all out 
to get out. For them the solu tlon to this 
grlm confilct Is "to pull out the stopper and 
let's have a whopper." I respect the right of 
those, who are so Inclined, to express dlssen t 
from policies of restraint, even to the extent 
of calllng for a return to the Stone-Age, but 
I also moot respectfully disagree wlth them. 
The honorable road out of VIet Nam Is not 
one which leads ever more deeply Into Asla. A 
desirable end to the war ln VIet Nam Is not 
to be round by extending the battlefields to 
the rest or Southeast Asia and to China 
It Is, or ought to be, crystal clear to all by 
this late date, that It Is very easy to expand 
this Involvement on the Asl:m malnland, but 
that It Is Immensely difficult to contract lt. 
I do not believe that the circumstances of 
this conflict have generated any great en-
thusiasm !or expansion of the war. Rather 
they have Induced a deep concern as to Ita 
extent and the elusiveness of Its conclusion. 
It ls no less a concern because It ls accom-
panied by a silent acceptance or Ita great 
008ts. The !act ls that the war bewilders. The 
sensltlvttles or our society are changed, 
Figures totallng billions of dollars tend to be 
regarded now with the non-comprehension 
o! scores ln a sport In which we are not In-
terested. Unless a!Iected directly by personal 
oonslderatlons, the grisly casualty counts are 
accepted wlth the same non-thought as the 
regular morning cup o! coffee. In the growing 
demands of war there Is a tendency to con-
sign to a llmbo preulng dom~stlc problems 
and other lsues Of foreign poliC\' 
An educated guess or the monetary costs 
of VIet Nam runs from •2 billion a month, 
or •24. billion annually, to $2 7 billion per 
month or more than •32 billion annually 
Certainly a ll.gure or •25 billion !or a year 
gives some reasonable Indication of the cur-
rent rate of spending !or the war. It Is a 
figure, mol'eover, that le not going down; 
It Is going up. Keep In mind, moreover, that 
I am speaklng only ot the cost of our military 
eltort In VIet Nam. That represents only 
about a third or our annual defense ex-
penditures or over $70 billion 
It might be possible to appreciate what 
•25 bUllon a year tor war In VIet Nnm means 
1t the figure 1s compared with the annual 
coet o! certain other federal programs. On 
the basi• o! the President's budget requests 
In January !or the coming fiscal year, !or 
example: 
Fourteen weeks or war expenditures In 
VIet Nam would fund all federal tralU!portn-
tlon proposals, Including our huge highway 
construction program and the development 
of such Items as high-speed railroad and 
commuter services and the supersonic pas-
senger airplane; 
A year's coot of veterans' benefits and serv-
Ices growing out or all past wars could be 
met with 12 weeks of current war expendi-
tures ln VIet Nam; 
Eight weeks or military expenses In VIet 
Nam equal all of the federal montes sought 
for educatlon__..,lementary, secondary, higher, 
vocational and lnt~rnatlonnl and the spe-
cial funds for Improving education In city 
slums and depressed rural areas; 
The costs of all housing and urban affairs 
programs o! the federal government, Includ-
Ing slum clearance and other efforts to make 
the nation's cities safer and more satisfying 
places for human hab~tatlon represent 6 
weeks or the cost of the VIetnamese war; 
The entire Food !or Peace program which 
feeds mllllons ot hungry people abroad Is 
supported on the equlv~tlcnt of ieHs than 4 
weeks of war coste In Vlet Nnm. 
The International activities In which we 
participate tor the purposes of h umanltnrlan 
and economic goals and above all, a more 
stable peace, can be expressed In similar 
stark contrasts. The annual level of U.S. 
appropriations, for example, for the Inter-
American Alliance for Progress--much o! 
which Is repayable, represents only about 6 
weeks of war-costs In VIet Nam. One eco-
nomist has estimated that a needed redis-
tribution of farm land to peasants through-
out India, Pakistan, the coastal areas of 
Asln, and all of Latin America, could be 
brought about equitably and without con-
fiscation, !or about $5 bllllon o! total cost. 
That would be the equivalent of 10 weeks o! 
war expenditures In VIetNam. Finally a look 
at United Nations costs suggests that the 
entire annual U.S. contribution to the regu-
lar budget an·d to all other programs of that 
organization, such as the peace keeping mis-
sions In the Middle East, Cyprus and else-
where comes to 80 hours or 3 days o! war 
expenditures In VIet Nam. 
That the great burden of VIet Nnm has 
been met without shifting the economy to a 
wartime tooting and with surprisingly little 
Inflation Is a commentary on the vitality or 
the nation's productl•e facilities. It Is also 
a tribute to the skill with which the Presi-
dent and hls Administration have conducted 
the federal government's role In the nation's 
economic and fiscal altalrs. 
Nevertheless, It would pointless to Ignore 
the prospect or a convergence or factors 
which may require us to accept controls and 
higher taxes or alternatively, to suffer a 
st'rlous and, In the end, destructive lnftntton. 
We are approaching the point where growing 
needs In VIet Nam are beginning to draw 
significant numbers or •k111ed workers out 
o! civilian production Into military service 
and defense Industries. At the same time, 
there Is no corresponding decrease In the de-
mand for consumer goods. To fill the gap in 
part, we import In greater and greater quun-
tltles and this process, In turn. leads to grow-
Ing compllcatlons and difficulties ln the bal-
ance of payments. 
Whatever the economic Implications, how-
ever, the fundamental tragedy or VIet Nam 
lies not so much In those considerations as 
In the toll o! human life and hope. Already 
the over-all casual ties are more than one-
third that o! the Korean war. 
It Is grim to speak or hu nan suffering by 
way o! statistics, yet some numerical com-
parisons are necessary If we are to under-
stand the dimensions of VIet Nam. In the 
first three week• of April, !or example, 518 
Americans were killed In action. These young 
men joined over 10,000 others who have loot 
their Uvea since U.S. troops were committed 
to VIet Nam. So far the number of young 
PennsylvanlalU! alone who have been killed 
In VIetNam Is about equal to the entire stu-
dent body o! Haverford College. 
In addition to the dend, there have been 
over 60,000 Americans wounded ln VIet Nam. 
To gl ve this figure of 60,000 some sense oC the 
pain It has entailed, note that It would be 
the equivalent If every man, womnn and 
child In the city suffered an Injury In some 
sudden and appallng disaster In Httverford. 
The clvlllnn analogy Is apt because In addi-
tion to the military casualties which have 
occurred, the war In VIet Nam Inflicts great 
pain on those who are caught up In Its 
crossflres and In the lncredl bly brutal fury 
which characterizes Intra-VIetnamese politi-
cal rl valrles and hatreds. Major General 
Ja111es Humphreys, director of our public 
health efforts In VIet Nam, recently esti-
mated that 50,000 clvlllnns would be treated 
for war-related Injuries In government hos-
pitals In South VIetNam this year. Of course, 
this figure says nothing of the countless 
deaths, accidental and unreported which are 
Induced by military action. It says nothing ot 
the poll tical murders and mutilations. It says 
not.htng nr tho {'0\lllt.IC'SS lnjnrpd who KO un-
treated In a land of limited nnd, In mnny 
o.reas, non-existent n1edlc£Ll scrvtcc.!:i. 
The hostile military forces agnlnst whom 
we are pitted have also been hnrd hit. Otllclal 
sources list the combined total of North VIet-
namese and the VIet Gong killed ln action 
In South VIet Nam as 149,000 for 1966, with 
weekly totals at times this year In excess oC 
2,000. These figures are lndlcatl ve of the gre' t 
destructiveness of the repertoire of modern 
weapons which has been drawn upon !or use 
In VIet Nam. Yet, enemy forces continue the 
struggle and actually. are gl'owlng in num-
bers. The latest Pentagon figures show enemy 
strength at record levels-287,000 today «S 
compared to 239,000 a. year ago. This Increase 
Is In the face or an estimated loss of half-
million In the war to date. 
Vlhat was, scarcely two years ago, prepon-
der.<ntly a war among VIetnamese has now 
become preponderantly war between hostile 
VIetnamese and U.S. forces. The total number 
of American ground forces In VIetNam went 
from 45,000 In 1965 to 400,000 by the end of 
1966. It Is In the neighborhood of 450,000 
today and there Is talk, even now, of the need 
!or an additional Marine division nne' one or 
two additional army divisions. The prospect 
of an Increase well beyond 500,000 by the end 
of this year Is not to be dismissed. This pros-
pect In fact, Is enhanced by the recent con-
signment or new responsibilities to the U.S. 
mill tary command In the work of pacification 
and the posslbllltles or the expansion of the 
U.S. military effort Into the delta reglone or 
the Mekong United States forces havlng re-
placed the Saigon armies as the pr1nclpa.J 
combatant on the front linea In the North 
and West of South VIet Nnm may now be on 
the way to becoming the major mllltary ele-
ment In the Southern sector and the rear 
areas. This delta region and the work of 
pacification have heretofore been consigned 
to the Sout:1 VIetnamese authorities working 
In concert with a few American civilian and 
m1Ut.ary advisors. 
There Is currently, colnci..Jent with these 
changes, some expression o! views from 
"anonymous" but "official sources" that a 
military victory Is just around the corner and 
that It can finally be achieved by another new 
Input of American forces and effort. The 
same Ceellng, however, It should be noted, has 
been present In the past, pr1or to significant 
new Inputs or usages of U.S. mllltary power. 
And after each added military step, I regret 
to note the forecasts of an Imminent resolu-
tion or the conflict have ceased. 
I think It Is to be anticipated that the 
process of Increasing the U.S. mllltary role In 
Installments will go on, but In my judgment 
the search !or a decision by force of arms 
will be as elusive as the quest !or a just solu-
tion by diplomatic negotiations hl\8 so far 
proved to be. 
In short, the prospects for a rcstora tlon 
of pearc In the near !utllre are not at all 
encournBing. We will do well to face, now, 
the fact that enormous risks lie ahead on 
the pre,ent mlllt.1ry course. The prospect of 
a direct military conflict with Chinn obvi-
ously Is somewhere along the path or nn ex-
panding war In VIetNam and Southeast Asia. 
It Is not Important that, as a matter of pol-
Icy, we do not wish to threaten Chinese In-
terests on the Asian mainland and hnve so 
stated many times. What Is Important nre 
the Implications of our growing military ef-
fort In VIet Nam as seen through the spec-
tacl~s of Chinese xenophobia. The cosmic 
gyrations of the Chinese "cultural revolu-
tion" are Indicative ot the Immense enigma 
which China poses for our pollcles. It Is not 
safe to assume, wl th any degree of assurance, 
what may be the eventual result of this great 
political upheaval in China. It may mean a 
more mllltant China; It by no means guar-
antees a less mill tant China. Insofar as we are 
concerned, there Is no reason to eKpect as a 
consequence o! the inner struggle any red uc-
tlon In Chinese suspicion or us or any re-
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mission in the hostility with which they have 
regarded our course In Viet Nam !rom the 
beginning. This response to us, In VIet Nam, 
It should he noted, hM Its roots at least as 
much In Chlneoe history and tradition as In 
Chinese Ideological theory. 
To reiterate, the Chinese response to us In 
Viet Nam will be little atrected by current 
developments In China, In the absence of 
other changes In the situation. In any event, 
there are signs that the Ideological fury with-
In that Immense nation has begun to abate. 
Chinese foreign trade has not been cut by 
the action of the Red Guards although It 
may sutrer !rom the current Hong Kong un-
rest. So far as anyone Is aware the nuclear 
project In Lop Nor continues to operate at 
full blast In the deserts of Slnklang. Most 
Important In Its Implications !or VIet Nam, 
the Chinese-Soviet conflict has been put 
aside at least sufficiently to perm! t Soviet 
mflltary supplies for Hanoi to flow unim-
peded overland through China. 
There Is some tendency to dlsmlss the Chi-
nese as a significant !actor In the considera-
tions which should be given our course In 
VIet Nam. A preoccupation with the 
poeslbllltles of a U.S.-Chlnese clash Is re-
garded In some quarters as unwarranted, to 
say the least. The view Is that the Chinese 
dragon, out or preoccupation or prudence, 
will bellow but not bite. It would be well to 
recall that similar sentiments were expressed 
In connection with Korea. Indeed, they were 
expressed In a kind of whistling In the dark 
even a.!ter the Initial reports began to come 
In that the Chinese bad cr06Sed the Yalu 
and clashed with U.S. forces In the far North. 
Since my memory goes back that far, I hope 
you will forgive me If I reiterate that the 
prospect of war with Cblna emerging !rom 
the Vietnamese conflict cannot be dismissed. 
And I hope you will forgive me 1! I reiterate, 
too, what I reported on returning !rom VIet 
Nam 1~ yee.rs ago. I said then and I repeat 
now: the war In VIet Nam could become 
open-ended and the end Is not In sight. One 
of the most significant statements of General 
Westmoreland, the able soldier who com-
mands the U.S. forces In VIet Nam, on his 
visit In this country a few weeks ago, was 
that an end of the w&r 1n VIet Nam Is not 
1n sight. Presumably he meant a mllltary 
termination of the war. That was the sober 
opinion of a soldier on a matter In which his 
professional competence gives his opinion a 
special significance. 
In the light of General Westmoreland's es-
timate, It would seem to me to be prudent, 
as I have stated, to anticipate an enlargement 
of the war In VietNam. Yet I d'o not wish to 
suggest that the war wm Inevitably escalate 
towards a grim Infinity. I have suggested on 
occasion the possibility of limiting the m111-
tary conflict, so long as It must persist, to 
South VIet Nam. Indeed, the rationale !or 
the bombing of the North can be eliminated 
on the basts of a defensive m111tary barrier 
on the ground, south of the 17th parallel. 
That could do what aerial bombing or the 
North was expected to do but has not done, 
namely, Interdict the lines of supply and 
communication between north and south 
VIet Nam. Senator John Sherman Cooper, of 
Kentucky, recently asked that the bombing 
In the North be limited to these supply routes 
and that, too, Is a step towards limiting the 
war. 
In the end, however, negotiations alone can 
supply a sure and permanent limitation or 
termination of the confl1ct. In the end , a way 
must be found to negotiate an honorable 
peace. That would be a peace which Is not 
sought on the basis of an elusive m1lltary 
triumph. Rather It would be a peace grounded 
In the principle that tbe rights or the VIet-
namese people are paramount In this situa-
tion. It ls their country and their future 
which are at stake. Indeed, that Ia the prin-
ciple which President Johnson, Ho Chi Minh 
and all others concerned have contended Ia 
the basts !or the current mllttary efforts. The 
problem Is how to Initiate negotiations which 
might lead to a common concept of the prin-
ciple and agreement on menns by which It Is 
to be put Into practice. 
The etrort to open negotiations to end the 
war hl\6 been so far an exercise In complete 
frustration. OountleSII proposals have been 
advanced and they have come to naught. 
I have long felt. along with many others, !or 
example, that the proper vehicle !or peace 
talks Is the Geneva Conferences. These con-
ferences brought the war In Indo-China to 
an end In 1954 and In 1962, produced a 
treaty which, whatever Its shortcomings, did 
return a measure of peace to a Laos on the 
verge of collapse. The Geneva Conference has 
the merit or being recognized not only by 
North Viet Nam, but by China. Oetting the 
Con!erence pa.rttctpan ts to face up to their 
respons1bll1t1es, however, Is another matter. 
I have also sought to have greater atten-
tion given to the views General de Gaulle 
and Cambodia's Prince Norodom Slhanouk 
and U Thant and I have advocated a meet-
Ing between Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
and China's foreign mlnlster, Chen Yl. An 
all-Asian conference of friend and foe alike 
has also been proposed as an elaboration of 
last year's Manila meeting. I have urged that 
the brief cease-fires which we have seen dur-
Ing holiday periods In VIet Nam be extended 
and coupled with a military "stand!ast" on 
land, sea and alr as a prelude to negotia-
tions. I have suggested that South VIetNam's 
borders be Inspected and patrolled by the 
three-nation International Control Com-
mission. 
When It became apparent that traditional 
secret diplomacy had !ailed to open up a 
road to negotiations, I began to urge last !all 
a formal and open U .N. contribution to the 
effort to restore peace should be sought. 
With an due respect to U Thant, the dedi-
cated Secretary-General, the U.N. a.; an or-
ganization bas yet to face up to the respon-
sibilities which are Imposed by this situa-
tion. 
I do not think anyone expcts miracles !rom 
that organization but I do think that all 
members of the U.N. have an obligation to 
make a concerted contribution through Its 
machinery to the search !or peace. It would 
appear to me to be most approprla te, for ex-
ample, !or the Security Counc11 to Issue a 
call by formal resolution to all who are di-
rectly or lndlrectly engaged In VIet Na.rn-
member and non-member or the U.N. alike--
to confer In New York or Geneva. A confron-
tation of positions and a consideration of 
ways and means to res tore peace In VIetNam 
In this !ashton Is In order and It Is urgent. 
I do not know whether It would be effective 
but I see no reason why It should not be at-
tempted or why this nation should not take a 
strong Initiative In connection therewith. I 
will state, on my own respons1b111ty, that the 
President would not look with disfavor on 
such a proposal. , 
In view o! the grim estimate of the Viet 
N&rn war, which I have just given you, you 
may be asking at this moment: "Where do 
I come In or, perhaps, where do I get out, or. 
perhaps, when does he get out?" As I told 
you at the outset, I do not have punch-card 
answers, either !or the war In VIetNam or In 
terms of Its personal Implications. For you, 
the concern Is direct. The draft Is already an 
Important consideration In your life. But 
concern for ending the conflict needs to go 
beyond the Immediate problems of the draft. 
Important as that may be to each Individual. 
The Implications of a run-away war, with full 
Chinese Involvement and even Russia at a 
later stage are staggering to contemplate. 
Even without a great expansion, the lives 
of additional thousands of Americans and 
Asians, both m111tary and c1v111an, are forfeit, 
I! we do not achieve an end to this contuct 
In the near future. The well-being of the 
U.S. economy. Which Is, after all the under-
pinning of our International position, Is at 
stake. The survival or humanism, tr n ot of 
humanity Itself, Is Increasingly thrown Into 
doubt as the persistence of the war Induces 
the removal of restraints and an even greater 
callousness to human suffering. 
As graduates, you have a epectal respon-
sibility as well as a •pedal concern. It Is 
larger than protest. It Is a responsibility to 
try to understand and to contribute to the 
understanding of others so that no stone 
may be left unturned In the search !or peace. 
Much has happened elnce Olen Bien Phu. 
Many persons have been Involved--com-
munists and non-Communists. Americans 
and foreigners, Democrats and Republicans. 
Mistakes have been made. Good Intentions 
have been distorted. At this late date, the 
question Is not "who got us here and why?" 
but "where do we go !rom here and how?" 
In connection therewith, I hope that I have 
at least made the point that as one Ameri-
can, as one Senator, I believe without 
reservation that It Is In the Interests of the 
United States and all others Involved In 
VIet Nam and the world to scale down these 
host111tles as quickly as possible. I believe It 
Is In the common Interest to get to the con-
ference table without delay, to bring this 
war to an honorable end and to begin using 
the Immense energy and resources which 
are now preempted by the conflict !or the 
constructive works of peace. 
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IN THE SHADOW OF VIET NAM 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D . , Montana) 
Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania 
Tuesday, May 30, 1967, 11 :00 A.M. 
It is doubtful that there has ever been a good 
time to graduate from college . There is only an inevitable time 
and you have arrived at it. If you have a sense of concern as to 
the future, it may be somewhat reassuring to note that it is a 
feeling which has been shared by gradua~ing c~~~~cs as far back 
as anyone can remerrber . 
~ ~ ~~is class v _ : s o7 is ~ .., ..... e to an 
uncommon co:_'"' -c:ne future . You ~raduate in uncommon 
circumsta:-_-::.:;:s . !ou vralk out directly into the ::._.'""'C.ow of Viet 
Nam . 
Since that is the case, you are not likely to have 
much interes-c in what I might say about the job opportunities 
"out there 11 • Nor do I believe that you would be especially 
enthralled by co~~ents on medicare, highway beautification, 
/ 
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antipoverty programs, the peace corps or a dozen or more other 
creative and useful legislative enterprises which have been 
initiated in recent years by the federal government . 
I expect that what you expect from me is to make 
some sense on the question of Viet Nam--on ~?e war and its pros -
pects and your prospects in the light of it . I do not know that 
I can live up to those expectations if what you seek is a punch-
card computation of satisfying answers. I do r.ot have that sort 
of information and I do not know how to run the co,aputers . As 
one Senator, I have o~ly the personal estinates a~d a~titudes 
which come fro~ a long effort to try to understand what is involved 
in the problems of Viet Nam and Asia . I have only the concerns 
which I share with young people as to their personal future in 
the light of this persisting difficulty . I have only an avmreness 
of the curtain of uncertainty which Viet Nam has drawn across the 
/ 
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pursuit of happiness in this nation and the prospects for con-
tinued civilized survival everywhere in the world . 
On the part of the United States, the eventual 
resolution of the conflict in Viet Nam will depend greatly on 
the President and the Executive Branch of the government . It 
will, also, depend in part on Senators and Congressmen . In the 
last analysis, however, it will depend heavily on the people of 
the nation and, in particular, on the reaction of young persons 
such as yourselves to this situation. Your opinions on Viet Nam 
are relevant a:_c. you have not only a right but, if you are so 
i~clined, a p~blic duty to express them . You also have, however, 
an obligation to ask; you have a responsibility to listen and these 
are antecedent to the responsible exercise of your right and duty 
to speak. In short, you owe it to yourselves, to your country 
and to the vitality of the institutions in which you have matured 
to make your opir!ions as informed as possible . In the hope o.f 
contributing something to that end, I make these remarks today . 
I 
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The Viet Nam war has been so often in the news 
·chat at times it seems that for several years nothing else of 
note has happened in the world . He have had an incessant born-
bardment from the communications media . He have been exposed 
to the horrors and the heroics and to the destruction and the 
ced::.cation of this >Jar . 1\fe have had alr:wst a surfeit of facts 
as v:ell as a torrent of irrelevances . Yet pattern of the 
conflict is illusive and its purpoues re~ai~ ooucure . We have 
k.1own the frust:c&.tion ::hie;:,. co:-.'les :::~ror.: an ever ::::ore intensely 
sought pE.;a.Ct.. in a:::. ever r.w:..~e inte:r.sely fought we::. 
It is di:'fict:.lt in these ci:tcU! .. star.ces to maintain 
a balanced viHT of the conflict or our ro:!..e in ~ --~ v. Indeed, the 
Vie"cname. cor..flict is as a pmverful drug uhich has been ad-
r.1iniste re<i to the JL":lerican body po:::.::.. tic . 'I':1e effect on so::ne 
individuals ;:,.as been that of a heady stimulant; they would go all 
out to get out. For them the solution to this grim conflict is 
11 to pull out the stopper and let'...; have a whopper . 11 I respect 
I 
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·c_:c :.~ig!'/.:; of tnose_, Kho a~e so inclined, to express dissent from 
)O~~cies of r00train~, even to the extent of calling for a return 
·co ·c:-:e s·co:c.e-Age, but I also rr.ost respectfully disagree with them . 
·..::ne ~"lor..ol'&o:::..e road out of Viet Na::n is not one which leads ever 
~ .. o:.-e deeply i:"lto .huia. A desirable end ·co the war in Viet Nam is 
~o·c "co ·:Je ::ou:..1d by ex·cendir..g the battlefields to the rest of South-
east Asia ::..::-.d ·co Chi:la. It is" or o<J.ght ·co be" crystal clear to all 
bJ this ::.ate da·ce, that iJc is very es.sy ·co exp&:::a. -c.-:::..s involvement 
on ~he Asian mainland, bUG -cha-c it is ir~,ensely difficult to con-
tract it. 
I do not believe that the circumstances of this 
conflict have generated any great enthusiasm for expansion of the 
1·Jar . Rat!'le:r they have induced a deep conce:.~n as to its extent 
ar_d the elusiveness of its conclusion . It is no less a concern 
because it is accompanied by a silent acceptance of its great costs . 
The fact is that the war bewilders . The sensitivities of our 
society are changed . Figures totaling billions of dollars tend 
/ 
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-co be rega.2ded no~r ·,:i-cl:. ~;h2 non-comprehenslon of scores in a spor··c 
U11less a:'fectec.. directly by 
pe~sona: co~side:a~ions, t~e ;~isly casualty co~~ts are accepted 
re.;u:a:~ !T.o:r·n::..ng cup of cof:'ee. 
L1 the sro'.~ inr- c.. ....... !h..os o:- .. ~r ~~here ~e~de~cy to consign to a 
::.i~oo p:;.·esulr...,_, ao ... es~ic p:.~oble ... s an.d o~hc:.· issues of foreign policy . 
.!1 educe...~  .:_;uess of ·c:.e :T.Oneva:.y COS~S of V::...et 
~a: .. :·1..u1.S -'-·c ... ....,2 b.:.ll::..o::! a mor..tr., o: $2...,. 'b:_::::..or.. a:-... rmally, to 
Ce:~tainly a _.:_gure of $25 bil::.ion _~or a year gives some reasonable 
~o:.:eover, 
::..s not go::..n do·. [l; -" 
spea ........ 3 only o:' 
.:.s 
- ~ 
v-... \.... 
It is 
.;o::..n; up . Keep 
COu-'-' of our 
That ~epresents o~ly about a third 
o~ our ~nnual defense expe~di~ures of over $70 bil::.ion . 
I 
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r·c ~ight be possible to appreciate what $25 billion 
e. vco.:: fo:.:· -,·rc..J.· i~ Viet Nam means if the figure is compared with the 
~-~~~al cos~ o: certain ot~er federal programs . 0~ the basis of the 
?:::es:..G.en~: s bc:C:.;jc·c reques·cs in Janua:c7 for the coming f:::.scal year , 
:~or exam-:Jle : 
?o~::tcen week~ of war expenditures in Viet Nam 
i::;.cl1-:.G.:::..ng our huge ni;::;i;_T,Jay cons-cruc-cion progran 
a~d t~e development of such items as hig~- speed 
railroad and com~'Y~uter services and the supersonic 
passe~ger airplane; 
A year's cos~ of veterans' benefits and services 
growing out of all past wars could be met with 12 
weeks of current war expenditures in Viet Nam; 
Eight 1·!eeks of r.:ili ta::-y expenses in Viet Nam equal · 
all of the federal monies sought for education--
• elementary_, secondary, higher, vocational and 
I 
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in\,ernc.::cional- - and ·che specic.l f'.lnc::; fo:c :;_r;,p::.~oving 
education in c~ty sl~s and depressed :cural areas; 
~~e costs of all housinz a~d urba~ affairs progrrulis 
o_' tr.e feder&l c;ove:~nmec.-'c, inc:::.uc.in;?; slUI.1 clea::ance 
and other ef:orts to m~ke the L~tio~'s cities safer 
and mo:::-.c sa·cis..:'ying places fo:~ t:ur::c:.n f'.""bi tat ion 
:·cp-·csc.!t 6 ":o~eeks o..:~ the cost of -che Vi ..;-:namese Har; 
•. .:.:lions o..:' hun[!ry pl..ople a'.Jroad is supported on 
t .. 1~ equiva:e .... ~v of' less -chan \:reeks of 1\"ar costs 
in Viet 
The international acti vi c.ies in lvhich '::e participate 
for the pu~poses of hQ~~nitarian and economic goals and above all, a 
r.1ore stable peace, ca'{l be expressed in similar stark con-crasts . The 
annu~l ::..evel of' U. S . appropria ·cions, fo:. exar:::ple, ::or the inter-
Arnerica~'1 Allia:'lce for Progress--much of which is repayable, 
I 
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::e~:):.~csents only about 6 1;eeks 01~ '."Jar-costs in Viet l'~arrt. One 
economist has estimatea that a needed redistribution of farm land 
to peasa:1ts ·chroughout In.dia, -'c..:.ki.sta:1, the coastal areas of Asia, 
a:!:.d all of La"Gi!'l .IL'!le::-·ica, could be· brought abou·c equitably and 
,,ri thm:::c con:'isca·cion, for abou·c $5 billion of total cost. That 
would be the equivalent of 10 weeks of war expenditures in Viet 
?inally a loo~<:. ..., --C.v Na"cior...s costs su~6ests that; the 
entire annual U.S. co .. ·c::·io·u.tion to the regu:!..ar budge·;; and to all 
otr.e:.:- progra:.1s a:' ·c:.at o:.:ga:1izc.-cio!1, such as ·c.c.c p.:::;ace keeping 
missions ir.. tr.e MidQle East> Cyprus a:.-:d elsewhere comes -co 80 hours 
o:.h 3 days o::~ Ha:.· expendi tu:res in Viet .ra~ .. 
That the great burden of Viet Nam has been met with-
out s::ift;::..!'lg the economy ·co a \·ra:rtime footing and with surprisingly 
little i:::flatlor: is a com.;-r.entary on ·che vitality of the nation 1 s 
prod~ctive fac::..lities. It :..s a:::..so a tribut;e to the skill with >vhich 
t;he ?resident and his Administ::ation have conducted the federal 
govern~er...t's ~ole in the natio:1's economic and fiscal affairs . 
I 
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Nevertheless, it would be pointless to ignore the 
prospect of a convergence of factors which may require us to accept 
controls and higher taxes or alternatively, to suffer a serious and, 
in the end, destructive inflation. We are approaching the point 
· 1'lhere gro"l'ring needs in Viet Nam are beginning to draw significant 
n~~bers of skilled workers out of civilian production into military 
service and defense industries. At the same time, there is no 
corresponding decrease in the demand for consumer goods. To fill 
the gap in part, we import in greater and greater quantities and 
this process, in turn, leads to growing complications and difficul-
ties in the balance of payments. 
Whatever the economic implications , however, th 
fundamental tragedy of Viet Nam lies not so much in those considera-
tions as in the toll of human life and hope. Already the over-all 
casualties are more than one-third that of the Korean war. 
XE RO 
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It is grim to speak of human suffering by way of 
st~tistics, yet some numerical comparisons are necessary if ·we 
are to understand the dimensions ·of Viet Nam . In the first three 
weeks of April, for example, 518 Americans were killed in action . 
ove..-u (O, oors 
These young men joined neaFly 3,@@0 others who have lost their 
lives since U. S . troops were committed to Viet Nam . So far the 
number of young Pennsylvanians alone who have been killed in Viet 
Nam is about equal to the entire student body of Haverford College. 
~ 0o,ooo 
In addition to the dead, there have been 
(-,O, CX>O 
Americans wounded in Viet Nam. To give this figure of 53 ; 0Q® 
some sense of the pain it has entailed, note that it would be the 
equivalent if every man, woman and child in the city suffered an 
injury in some sudden and appalling disaster in Haverford . 
The civilian analogy is apt because in addition 
to the military casualties which have occurred, the war in Viet 
Nam inflicts great pain on those who are caught up in its cross -
fires and in the incredibly brutal fury which characterizes intra-
Vietnamese political rivalries and hatreds . Major General James 
0 
/ 
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Humphreys, director of our public h~alth efforts in Viet Nam, 
recently estimated that 50, 000 c ivilians would be treated for 
war-related injuries in government hospi tals in South Viet Nam 
this year . Of course, this figure says nothing of the countless 
deaths, accidental and unreported which are induced by military 
action. It says nothing of the political murders and mutilations . 
It says nothing of the countless injured who go untreated in a 
land of limited and, in many areas, non- exisDant medical services. 
The hostile military forces against whom we are 
pitted have also been hard hit. Official sources list the com-
bined total of North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong killed in action 
in South Viet Nam as 149,000 for 1966, with weekly totals at times 
this year in excess of 2,000 . These figures are indicative of the 
great destructiveness of the repertoire of modern weapons which 
has been drawn upon for use in Viet Nam . Yet , enemy forces continue 
the struggle and actually, are growing in numbers . The latest 
J 
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Pentagon figures show enemy strength at record levels--287,000 
today as compared to 239,000 a year ago. This increase is in the 
face of an estimated loss of half-million in the war to date. 
~ 
What was, scarocely two years ago, preponderantly 
a war among Vietnamese has now become preponderantly war between 
hostile Vietnamese and U.S. forces . . The total number of American 
ground forces in Viet Nam went from 45,000 in 1965 to 4oo,ooo by 
the end of 1966. It is in the neighborhood of 450,000 today and 
there is talk, even now, of the need for an additional Marine 
division and one or two additional army divisions. The prospect 
~ 
of an increaseAbeyond 500,000 by the end of this year is not to be 
dismissed. This prospect, in faCtj is enhanced by the recent 
consignment of new responsibilities to the U.S. military command 
in the work of pacification and the possibilities of the expansion 
of the U.S. military effort into the delta regions of the Mekong . 
United States forces having replaced the Saigon armies as the 
principal combatant on the front lines in the North and West of 
I 
0 
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South Viet Nam may now be on the way to b~coming the major military 
element in the Southern sector and the rear areas. This delta 
region and the work of pacification have hereto~ore been consigned 
to the South Vietnamese authorities working in concert with a few 
American civilian and military advisors. 
There is currently, coincident with these changes, 
some expression of views from "anonymous" but "official sources" 
that a military victory is just around the corner and that it can 
finally be achieved by another new input of American forces and 
effort. The same feeling, however, it should be noted, has been 
present in the past, prior to significant new inputs or usages of 
U.S. military power. And after each added military step, I regret 
to note the forecasts of an imminent resolution of the conflict 
have ceased. 
I think it is to be anticipated that the process of 
increasing the U.S. military role in installments will go on, but 
in my judgment the search for a decision by force of arms will be 
as elus i ve as the quest for a just solution by diplomatic negotia-
I 
tions has so far proved to be. 
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In short , the prospects for a restoration of peace 
in the near future are not at all encouraging . We will do well to 
face, now, the fact that enormous risks lie ahead on the present 
military course . The prospect of a direct military conflict with 
China obviously is somewhere along the path of an expanding war 
in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. It is not important that, as a 
matter of policy, we do not wish to threaten Chinese interests on 
the Asian mainland and have so stated many time~ . What is important 
are the implications of our growing military effort in Viet Nam as 
seen through the spectacles of Chinese xenophobia . The cosmic 
gyrations of the Chinese "cultural revolution" are indicative of 
the immense enigma which China poses for our policies . It is not 
\ 
safe to assume, with any degree of assurance, what may be the 
eventual result of this great political upheaval in China. It 
may mean a more militant China; it by no means guarantees a less 
militant China. Insofar as we are concerned, there is no reason 
to expect as a consequence of the inner struggle any reduction in 
Chinese suspicion of us or any remission in the hostility with 
/ 
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which they have regarded our course in Viet Nam from the beginning. 
This response to us, in Viet Nam, it should be noted, has its roots 
at least as much in Chinese history and tradition as in Chinese 
ideological theory. 
To reiterate, the Chinese response to us in Viet 
Nam will be little affected by current developments in China, in. 
the absence of other changes in the situation. In any event, there 
are signs that the ideologic a l fury within that immense nation has 
begun to abate. Chinese foreign trade has not been cut by the 
action of t he Red Guards although it may suffer from the current 
Hong Kong unrest. So far as anyone is aware the nuclear project 
in Lop Nor continues to operate at full blast in the wes•erR deserts 
of Sinkiang. Most important in its implications for Viet Nam, the 
Chinese-Soviet conflict has been put aside at least sufficiently 
to permit Soviet military supplies for Hanoi to flow unimpeded 
overland through China. 
I 
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There is some tendency to dismiss .the Chinese 
as a significant factor in the considerations which should be given 
our course in Viet Nam. A preoccupation with the possibilities of 
a U.S.-Chinese clash is regarded in some quarters as unwarranted~ 
to say the least. The view is that the Chinese dragon~ out of 
preoccupation or prudence~ will bellow but not bite. It would be 
well to recall that similar sentiments were expressea in connection 
with Korea. Indeed~ they were expressed in a kind of whistling in 
the dark even after the initial reports began to come in that the 
Chinese had crossed the Yalu and clashed with U.S. forces in the 
far North. 
Since my memory goes back that far~ I hope you will 
forgive me if I reiterate that the prospect of war with China 
emerging from the Vietnamese conflict cannot be dismissed. And 
I hope you will forgive me if I reiterate~ too~ what I reported on 
CPu. ri-ji.,J.. 
returning from Viet Nam ~ years ago. I said then and I repeat 
~~ 
now: the war in Viet Nam ~ open-ended and the end is not in sight. 
/ 
I 
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One of the most significant· stateme·nts of General Westmoreland, 
the able soldier who commands the U.S. forces in Viet Nam, on his 
visit in this country a few weeks ago, was that an end of the war 
in Viet Nam is not in sight. Presumably he meant a military 
t~rmination of the war. That was the sober opinion of a soldier 
on a matter in which his professional competence gives his opinion 
a special significance . 
In the light of General \•.'estmoreland' s estimate, 
it would seem to me to be prudent, as I have stated, to anticipate 
an enlargement of the war in Viet Nam. Yet I do not wish to suggest 
that the war will inevitably escalate towards a grim infinity . I 
have suggested on occasion the possibility of limiting the military 
conflict, so long as it must pers ct , to South Viet Nam. Indeed, 
the rationale for the bombing of the North can be eliminated on 
the basis of a defensive military barrier on the ground, south of 
the 17th parallel. That could do what aerial bombing of the North 
was expected to do but has not done, namely, interdict the lines 
of supply and communication between north and south Viet Nam. 
XERO 
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Senator John Sherman Cooper, of Kentucky, recently asked that the 
bombing in the North be limited to these supply routes and that, 
too, is a step towards limiting the war. 
In the end, hovrever, negotiations alone can supply 
a sure and permanent limitation or termination of the conflict. 
In the end, a way must be found to negotiate an honorable peace. 
That would be a peace which is not sought on the basis of an 
elusive military triumph. Rather it would be a peace grounded 
in the principle that the rights of the Vietnamese people are 
paramount in this situation. It is their country and their future 
which are at stake. Indeed, that is the principle which President 
Johnson, Ho Chi Minh and all others concerned have contended is 
the basis for the current military efforts . The problem is how 
to initiate negotiations whi ch might lead to a common concept of 
the principle and agreement on means by which it is to be put into 
practice . 
XERO 
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The effort to open negotiations to end the war has 
been so far an exercise in complete frustration . Countless pro-
posals have been advanced and they have come to naught. I have 
long felt, along with many others, for example, that the proper 
.. 
vehicle for peace talks is the Geneva Conferences . These con-
ferences brought the war in Indo-China to an end in 1954 and in 
1962, produced a treaty which, l'lhateve its shortcomings, did 
return a measure of peace to a Laos on the verge of collapse. 
The Geneva Conference has the merit of being recognized not only 
by North Viet Na~, but by Chi na. Getting the Conference partici-
pants to face up to their responsibil ities, however, is another 
matter . 
I have also sought to have greater attention given 
to the views General de Gaulle and Cambodia's Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk and U Thant and I have advocated a meeting between 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and China's foreign minister, Chen Yi. 
An a ll-Asian conference of friend and foe alike has also been 
xr~o 
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proposed as an elaboration of last year's Manila meeting. I have 
urged that the brief cease-fires 'which we have seen during holiday 
periods in Viet Nam be extended and coupled 1trith a military 11 stand-
fast 11 on land, sea and air as a prelude to negotiations. I have 
J-~ 
suggested that South VietNam's borders be inspected/\by the three-
nation International Control Commission. 
When it became apparent that traditional secret 
diplomacy had failed to open up a road to negtiations, I began to 
urge last fall a formal and open U.N. contribution to the effort to 
restore peace should be sought . vii th all due respect to U Thant, 
the dedicated Secretary-General, t he U. N. as an organization has yet 
to face up to the responsibilities which are imposed by this situation . 
I do not think anyone expects miracles from that 
organization but I do think tha t all members of the U.N. have an 
obligation to make a concerted contribution through its machinery 
t o the search for peace. It would appear to me to be most appropriate, 
for example, for the Security Council to issue a call by formal 
resolution to all who are directly or indirectly engaged in Viet Nam- -
XERO 
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member and non-member of the U.N. alike--to conf e r in New York 
or Geneva . A confrontation of position~ ~nd a consider ation of 
vrays and means to restore peace in Viet arn in this fashion is in 
order and it is urgent. I do not knmv whether it would be effective 
but I see no reason why it sho, ld not be attempted or why this 
nation should not take a strong ;~~~iative in connection therewith . 
Y...A-"~ -xt0CL"' 07L ,.,~fto-u.J-r!..-~)~ -1-h. ;o~ 
t~ /'YU)I- .-t::A-~ .~..... --&-t- .T?\. ll-<.~ 0. 
In view o~rin estima e of the Viet 'T<t"" ".rar, 
which I have just given you, you may be asking at this moment: 
"....-here do I come in or, perhaps, where do I get out, or, perhaps, 
when does he get out? 11 As I told you at the outset, I do not have 
punch-card ans;.rers, either for the war in Viet Nam or in terms of 
its personal inplicat~ons. For you) t' e ~cern is direct. The 
draft is already an important consideration in your life . But 
concern for ending the conflict needs to go beyond the immediate 
problems of the draft, important as that ~ay be to each individual. 
The implications of a run-away w2 ~, with full Chinese involve ~nt 
and even Russia at a later stage are staggerjng to contemplate. 
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Even ,,rithout a gr eat expansion, th~ lives of additional thousands 
of Americans and Asians, both mil{'·,_ry and civilian, .are forfeit, 
if \ole do not achieve an end to this conflict in the near future. 
The well-being of the U.S. econorry, which is~ after all the under -
pinni~g of our international position~ is at stake . The survival 
of h~~an~sm, if not of humanity itself, is increasingly thrown 
into doubt as the persistence of the vnr induces the removal of 
restraints and an even greater callousness to human suffering. 
As graduates, you have a special responsibility 
as 1vell as a special concern. It is larger than protest. It is 
a responsibility to try to understand a.nd to contribute to the 
understanding of others so that no stone r.ay be left unturned in 
the search for peace. Much has happened since Dien Bien Phu . 
~.c>..ny persons have been involved--Commu..YJ.ists and non-Communists, 
Americans and foreigners, Democrats and Republicans. Mistakes have 
been made . Good i ntentions h~ve been distorted . At this late date, 
the question is not "who got us he " and i'Thy? " but "where do 1\!'e go 
from here and how?" 
XERO XEPO 
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In connection therewith, I hope that.I have at 
least made the point that as one American, as one Senator, I 
believe without reservation that it is in the interests of the 
United States and all others involved in Viet Narn and the world to 
·scale down these hostilities as quickly as possible . I believe it 
is in the common interest to get to t he _onference table without 
delay, to bring this war to an honorable end and to begin using 
the immense energy and resources which are now preempted by the 
conflict for the constructive works of peace . 
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